Lepanto report will lead to further investigations

Marine Court of Enquiry scheduled for 2025

SOUTH AFRICA: Following the release of the Preliminary Report into the sinking of the Lepanto this week, Minister of Transport, Barbara Creecy, has confirmed that a Marine Court of Enquiry will be convened in the first quarter of next year as recommended.

The report, which is based on an investigation undertaken by a team of eight from the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) also recommends the establishment of a Marine Accidents and Incident Investigation body that is independent of SAMSA as suggested within the Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy (CMTP).

Unable to determine one root cause for the capsizing of the vessel, the report notes that an underwater inspection of the vessel would assist any further investigation make more conclusive findings.

With no real decisive reasons highlighted within the report’s conclusions, the industry should welcome a Court of Enquiry that could provide findings to help prevent similar future incidents.

In a statement issued by the Department of Transport, the Minister noted that the conclusions of the report could not be seen to be final determinations and highlighted that a final report could only be issued after the Marine Court of Enquiry.

“My hope is that in releasing this report, we assist the families in a limited way in understanding what happened to their loved ones.” said Minister Creecy.

The report may be deemed limited, but does open up numerous topics for discussion as it includes information gained from interviewing 25 witnesses within Sea Harvest, the owner of the vessel as well as key personnel within SAMSA.

Perhaps the most poignant aspect of the report is the reference to the interviews with the nine survivors. These are crewmembers who lost 11 colleagues during the incident and will have had to return to sea to continue earning a living.

SAMSA’s preliminary enquiry was initiated as soon as the survivors returned to port where they met the crew that had been rescued by the Armana and brought into the Port of Cape Town.

It should not be surprising to read that they provided conflicting accounts of some of the circumstances on the vessel including whether the engine room door was open at the time of the incident. In addition, at least one of the survivors initially stated that it was open before changing his recollection during his second interview to state that it was closed.

One crew member alluded to the fact that two of the freeing ports opposite the starboard engine room door were seized, which he had reported to the chief engineer.

What does seem clear, however, is that once water flooded the deck, the vessel capsized and sank very quickly only allowing those on deck to escape.

The incident, which occurred in good light and relatively calm conditions, seems to have happened after the fishing nets had been secured and when the vessel rapidly increased her speed. According to the information supplied by the survivors, the crew had had a successful fishing trip that had resulted in a full stocker pond as well as some fish that had “spilled” onto the factory deck.

In addition, more bins were full of fish from a previous haul on the starboard side waiting to be processed.

The majority of the survivors agreed that the vessel capsized on her starboard side and that she sank stern first.

Although the Master did not survive, according to testimony, he was last seen ordering the crew to don their lifejackets.

Another rather tragic statement given by a survivor related to the lack of awareness that the liferaft contained a quoit that could have been thrown to a fellow crewmember who could not swim.

The report alludes to another possible contributor to the vessel sinking as the incorrect transfer of fuel from starboard to port in an attempt to correct the starboard list. The report confirms this to be in conflict with the Special Stability Requirements of the vessel’s Stability Book.  

The status of the vessel

Prior to heading to the fishing grounds on 14 May, the vessel had undertaken her bi-annual SAMSA dry docking survey and was in possession of a valid Local General Safety Certificate on her departure. She had also been issued with a Dry Dock Certificate for Hull to certify that various items had been attended to during her dry docking.

The vessel, however, returned to port after just one day at sea to undertake repairs on the main engine before once again heading out to the fishing grounds. The report appears to have ruled out engine failure as a contributory factor and confirms that none of the crewmembers reported hearing any explosions or loud bangs prior to the incident.

Issues relating to the stability of the vessel while at sea are highlighted within the report. These include non-compliance with Special Stability Instructions relating to the load of fish on board as well as the transfer of fuel between tanks.

The transfer of fuel in the wrong direction is seen to have aggravated the starboard list and consequently the stability of the vessel. The weight and distribution of the fish on board is also deemed problematic and a possible obstruction of the freeing ports that ultimately led to the water accumulation on deck.

These circumstances, combined with a vessel under full steam appear to have added to the cumulative impact of the day’s fishing activity. Ultimately the vessel’s list could not be corrected, and she capsized and sank.

The Marine Court of Enquiry will necessarily delve deeper into these and other possible causes including the impact that vessel modifications over an extended time may have had on the vessel’s stability.  

Sadly, however, the result cannot be changed. A total of 11 fishers did not come home on that day and the impact on their families will continue to be felt long into the future. Families that had to endure having their loved ones legally declared dead after their bodies were not found.

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