Beyond the Cape: What shipping route diversification means for South Africa

Turning challenges into economic opportunities

The Red Sea crisis that began in late 2023 has placed South Africa unexpectedly at the centre of global shipping disruption. As attacks on commercial vessels reduced traffic through the Suez Canal, shipping companies redirected vessels around the southern tip of Africa.

By the first week of March 2024, the gross tonnage of containerships arriving at the Cape of Good Hope had risen by 328% compared with the first half of December 2023, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The scale of the shift exposed how heavily global shipping depends on a small number of corridors.

In March 2026, Maersk announced that it was pausing Trans-Suez sailings on two services citing deteriorating security in the Middle East and rerouting them around the Cape of Good Hope.

For South Africa, this creates a difficult logistics equation. The Cape route is a valuable global safety valve, but more ships passing the country’s coast do not automatically translate into more business for its ports. The challenge is to turn South Africa’s strategic location into lasting economic value while maintaining reliable services for its own importers and exporters.

Busier waters might seem to mean more port revenue. However, research consultant Daniela Marggraff and senior researcher Timothy Walker of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria point out that this is a misconception: data shows “no obvious surge in vessel arrivals into South Africa’s main ports of Durban and Cape Town. Almost all diverted vessels travelling around the country are transiting rather than stopping to use its maritime services”.

This distinction matters. South Africa’s maritime interests cannot be measured simply by the volume of traffic diverted past its shores. They also depend on the reliability of the wider trading system in which its businesses operate.

Much of this traffic is Asia–Europe cargo that would normally have no reason to pass the country’s coast. UNCTAD estimates that routing ships around Africa adds about 12 days to an Asia–Europe voyage and reduces effective global container shipping capacity by roughly 9%. Across global trade, the average voyage lengthened from 4,831 miles in 2018 to 5,245 miles in 2024.

If Asia–Europe cargo has to be diverted around Africa whenever Suez becomes unsafe, South African ports will remain a pressure-release valve for disruptions thousands of kilometres away. A shipping system with several viable routes could ease this pressure and help cut emissions.

Emissions implications and polar navigation

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that shipping produced about 2.9% of global CO₂ emissions in 2018, and UNCTAD estimates that rerouting around southern Africa adds to this total. The IMO aims to cut total greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping by at least 20% by 2030 and 70% by 2040, compared with 2008 levels, and to reach net zero by or around 2050.

Shipping emissions are on the agenda of COP31, the UN climate conference in Antalya, Turkey, in November 2026. In April 2026, African Union ministers meeting in Johannesburg endorsed a continental strategy for maritime decarbonisation. Shorter routes are a practical step: other things being equal, moving the same cargo over a shorter distance requires less fuel.

Here the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along Russia’s Arctic coast, enters the discussion. According to the route’s infrastructure operator – Rosatom – the number of voyages along the NSR rose by 14% to 1,521 in 2025, while transit cargo reached a record 3.2 million tonnes.

Arctic shipping as a whole is growing too: according to the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group, 1,812 ships entered Arctic waters covered by the IMO Polar Code in 2025, 40% more than in 2013.

In 2025, container transit cargo on the NSR more than doubled to 410,000 tonnes. In August 2026, a regular seasonal container service between China and Europe was launched. The first voyage from Ningbo-Zhoushan to northern England took about 25 days, while Chinese carrier Sea Legend announced eight voyages for the 2026 season. South Korea’s PanStar sent the PanStar Acro from Busan to the UK in about 20 days, roughly a third of the Suez journey time, and plans up to three NSR voyages in 2027 and more thereafter.

However, diversifying Asia–Europe shipping takes more than drawing new lines on a map. Arctic navigation depends on icebreakers, hydrographic and weather data, port facilities, emergency response and clear rules for polar waters.

The NSR is best seen as a complement to established corridors such as Suez, which handled 26,434 vessels in 2023. Regular year-round eastbound shipping on the route is planned from 2027, and every additional Asia–Europe option eases the strain on the Cape during disruptions.

Lessons learned

The lesson of the Red Sea crisis extends beyond any single waterway. Global trade relies on a limited number of major corridors, so disruptions can quickly lead to congestion, higher transport costs and supply-chain problems elsewhere.

South Africa cannot control events in the Red Sea or the Suez Canal. But it can gain additional economic and logistical opportunities in a world where cargo flows have more than one viable route between major markets.

The Northern Sea Route is not a substitute for investment in South Africa’s ports, nor does it need to be. Its contribution is to widen the choices available to global trade.

For South Africa, the priority is to build lasting value from its maritime position within a system that is better able to withstand disruption. The Cape will remain essential. It should not have to be the world’s only fallback.

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