Is there a future for counter-drone technology on merchant ships?

As drone strikes claim seafarers' lives in the Black Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, Türkiye has asked the International Maritime Organization to begin work on rules for counter-drone technology on board merchant ships

Media reports highlight the issues facing merchant ships. Over two days in early October, drones struck four merchant ships in the Black Sea. On 5 October the Turkish-owned grain carrier Royad Mammadov, sailing from the Ukrainian port of Izmail to Ravenna in Italy, caught fire and sank inside Romania's exclusive economic zone.

Two crew members were reported killed. The next day a steward died aboard a Marshall Islands-flagged ship carrying rapeseed oil, and two more vessels were hit off Bulgaria. One of them, the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan, sank.

None of these ships was a party to the war. They were doing what merchant ships have always done: moving grain, oil and goods between ports. Yet across three separate conflict zones, drones have become one of the main threats facing seafarers.

Against this background, Türkiye has asked the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to consider whether existing guidance is enough, and to start technical work on a risk-based framework for the possible use of counter-drone systems on merchant ships.

In the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, the war between Russia and Ukraine has steadily drawn in civilian shipping. Around 30 seafarers have been killed in the Black Sea so far in 2026, according to IMO figures reported in the trade press, although the IMO itself has said precise numbers are difficult to verify.

At the end of August IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez condemned a series of attacks on merchant ships in the region, saying that "seafarers should never become casualties of conflicts to which they are not a party".

In the Gulf, the situation has been worse still. Since the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026, Iran has used speedboats, missiles, drones, sea mines and satellite-navigation jamming against shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

By mid-September the IMO had verified 80 attacks on international shipping in the area, which killed at least 22 seafarers and injured many more. In the early weeks of the conflict, some 20,000 seafarers were stranded inside the Gulf. Attacks have continued into October, with UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reporting four vessels hit by unknown projectiles between 1 and 4 October, alongside drone overflights and targeted surveillance of merchant ships.

In the Red Sea, the Houthi campaign that began in November 2023 showed early on how cheap unmanned systems could be turned against merchant ships. Three crew members died on the True Confidence in March 2024 and one on the Tutor in June 2024. In July 2025 the Magic Seas and the Eternity C were both sunk in attacks involving drones, skiffs, missiles and unmanned surface vessels, with at least four of the Eternity C's crew reported killed.

The threat has now returned. On 11 August 2026 the small Tanzania-flagged cargo ship Tihamah was struck while at anchor near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the IMO confirmed four crew fatalities. Two members of the team sent to evacuate the ship were also reportedly killed.

A proposal for self-protection

Türkiye's paper argues that the armed conflicts in these regions have sharply increased the risks for cargo ships and fishing vessels, creating what it calls "a compelling need" for technology that strengthens a vessel's ability to protect itself. It notes that counter-drone systems are developing rapidly and range widely. Some only detect, identify and track an approaching drone. Others use non-kinetic means to disrupt or neutralise it.

Türkiye is careful to present these systems as one additional layer of protection rather than a replacement for existing measures. Shipboard security plans, risk assessments, voyage planning and best management practices would all remain in place, and any counter-drone equipment would only be used where the relevant authorities permit it.

The paper looks back to the IMO's response to Somali piracy for a model. At that time the IMO issued guidance setting out the respective roles of flag States, shipowners, operators, masters, port States and coastal States in the use of privately contracted armed security personnel.

Türkiye believes a similar risk-based approach could work, but stresses that counter-drone systems are not directly comparable to armed guards. It identifies several issues that any future guidance would need to address:

◼︎ electromagnetic compatibility and interference with the ship's own navigation and communication systems
◼︎ cyber security
◼︎ crew competence and training
◼︎ human oversight and control of the systems
◼︎ a clear division of responsibilities between all the parties involved

The paper also makes clear that any IMO work in this area should not be read as permission to carry or use weapons or other security equipment where national or international law prohibits it. It proposes that the committee set up a correspondence group, or a similar technical arrangement, to develop recommendations.

An industry already on the move

Shipowners are not waiting for regulators. The Financial Times has reported that counter-drone suppliers report a sharp rise in enquiries from the shipping sector, particularly from tanker and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier operators and from vessels serving offshore oil and gas. Until recently, the main civilian buyers of maritime anti-drone equipment were superyacht owners keen to keep photographers at bay.

Available systems range from radar and camera detection to equipment that jams a drone's satellite-navigation or control signals, and even systems that take control of a hostile drone and land it safely. Operators with smaller budgets are turning to simpler physical defences, such as nets and suspended water tanks designed to snag a drone or make it detonate before it reaches a critical part of the ship. Industry observers point out that aerial drones remain the biggest danger, and that switching off the automatic identification system (AIS) offers little protection against a drone equipped with a camera.

Hard questions ahead

The technology may be available, but putting it on merchant ships raises difficult questions. Jamming is the most obvious example. Ships in the Gulf and the Black Sea are already struggling with widespread satellite-navigation interference.

A counter-drone system that broadcasts its own interference could add to the problem, affecting not only the ship using it but neighbouring vessels and shore-based services. This is why Türkiye's paper places such weight on safeguards for safety-critical systems.

There is also the question of who decides. A system that detects a threat is one thing. A system that disables or destroys it requires someone on board to make a decision, often within seconds, and that person needs training, clear authority and legal cover.

With a ship potentially passing through the waters of several States on a single voyage, each with its own laws on jamming and on carrying security equipment, the legal picture could quickly become complicated.

A layer, not a shield

So is there a future for counter-drone technology on merchant ships? On the evidence of the past three years, it seems likely, and the market suggests it is already arriving. The more pressing issue is whether international rules can keep pace with what is already being installed, so that detection and defensive systems protect crews without creating new hazards for navigation and communication.

What the technology cannot do is remove the underlying danger. As Arsenio Dominguez put it in September: “We are reaching a point where these conflicts are being used as a pretext to attack merchant vessels and innocent seafarers.”

Counter-drone systems may become a useful additional layer of protection. The responsibility for keeping seafarers out of the line of fire, however, still rests with the States waging these conflicts.

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